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Articles

MARYLAND RULE 5-704(b):
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE FOR ULTIMATE
ISSUE TESTIMONY
by Lisa Cuozzo
Introduction
In response to both the highly publicized trial of
John Hinckley, Jr. in 1984 and the recommendations
of the American Psychiatric Association (APA),
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984. 1 The Act changed many of the legal factors
associated with the insanity defense, including the
definition of legal insanity and the scope of expert
testimony permitted in insanity trials. 2 Congress
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 704 by adding a
second section which prohibits expert testimony on
ultimate issues of mental state or mental condition.3
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-704(b) maintains
that prohibition of expert testimony for most ultimate
issues but carves out one special exception.
Maryland allows testimony only on the ultimate issue
of criminal responsibility (Maryland's equivalent of the
insanity defense).4
This paper discusses why
Maryland Rule 5-704(b) should drop that exception
and be modified to agree with Federal Rule 704(b).
Section I explains the history of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984. In Section II, the discussion
turns to the rationale behind Maryland Rule 5-704(b).
Section III compares both rules and explains why the
Federal Rule results in a fairer trial. Finally, Section
David Cohen, Punishing the Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiatric
Testimony by Federal Rule of Evidence 704 (b) , Title IV, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 2067 (1984), cited in 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 541 (1988)
[hereinafter Reform Act).
1

2

See id.

FED. R. EVID. 704(b) reads: "No expert witness testifying with respect to
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state
an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have
the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged .
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone."
3

• MD. R. EVID. 5-704(b) reads: "An expert witness testifying with respect
to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may not
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant had a mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged. That
issue if for the trier of fact alone. This exception does not apply to an
ultimate issue of criminal responsibility." (emphasis added).

IV summarizes why the Maryland Rule intrudes on
that fairness and proposes a modification of Maryland
Rule 5-704(b).
I. History of the Act
In order to fully understand the Insanity Defense
Reform Act, it is essential to examaine the history
behind it, especially the trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.,
and the political climate at that time. One must also
understand the pressure that several interest groups
-- especially theAPA -- exerted on Congress, in an
effort to convince the legislature to agree with their
position.
A. Insanity Defense Before Hinckley
Before the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,
federal courts employed the American Law Institute
(AU) test for insanity. The ALI method is a two-prong
test, which provides that "A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if, at the time of such conduct, as
a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. liS
The first prong, referred to as the "cognitive prong,"
questions a person's capacity to know right from
wrong. The second prong, conforming conduct to the
law, is the "volitional prong."
In 1982, the Reagan administration called for the
abolition of the insanity defense. The administration
essentially sought to restrict the admissibility of
evidence of mental illness when offered to prove the
defendant did not have the requisite intent for the
crime charged. 6 In other words, such evidence would
only be permitted if the defendant was completely
unaware that he had a weapon in his hand, or was so
delusional he did not know he was harming a

5

MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1) (1962).

Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined,
94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1546 (1985).

6

28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 19
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person. 7 This movement, however, was unsuccessful
and the ALI insanity defense remained intact until
1984.
B. Trial of Hinckley
In 1976, John Hinckley, Jr. was a "drifter"
temporarily living in Hollywood. 8 He repeatedly
watched the film Taxi Driver, starring the actress
Jodie Foster, and started obsessing about Foster and
President Reagan. 9 In March of 1981, Hinckley, in an
effort to impress Foster, attempted to assassinate
President Reagan. 1o
Hinckley's trial gained extensive media attention,
not just because he targeted the President of the
United States, but also because Hinckley claimed
insanity as his defense. The government focused on
premeditation, emphasizing that Hinckley purchased
a gun and bullets, wrote a note to Foster immediately
preceding the shooting, and basically stalked the
President until he had a decent shot to take. ll The
defense, however, focused on Hinckley's "process
schizophrenia," especially his delusionsY As a
result, the trial came down to a battle.of the experts.
Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity,
and the public was outraged.
C. Public Pressure
Following the Hinckley trial, many groups
initiated a movement to change the insanity defense.
The APA, the American Medical Association, and the
American Bar Association are only three of the
groups that wrote to Congress seeking to change or
abolish the defense. At the same time, the public
was disgusted with the trial, the outcome, and the
whole idea of the insanity defense. According to a
survey conducted in the weeks following the Hinckley
verdict, "40% of the public, if jurors, would have had
no confidence in the psychiatric testimony; 20%
would have had only slight confidence."13

7 See

id.

D. Congress Passes the Insanity Defense
Reform Act
Pressured to make some change, Congress
passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act in 1984.14
The Act added an extra section to Federal Rule of
Evidence 704, thereby preventing expert testimony
on ultimate issues of mental state or mental
condition.15
The Act was passed for three basic reasons:
first, to "eliminate competing expert witnesses
testifying to directly contradictory conclusions;"16
second, because expert testimony was often
unreliable and confused juries;17 and third, because
experts were testifying to matters beyond their
expertise. 18 Congressional notes relied heavily on the
APA's statement, which will be discussed in detail
below.
Although the most obvious effect the Insanity
Defense Reform Act had on expert testimony was the
modification to Rule 704, expert testimony has also
been changed by the elimination of the volitional
prong. As a result of the Act, Congress dropped the
first prong of the ALI test. That change substantially
limits the insanity defense to only those who are
unable to understand right from wrong. This new
definition of insanity in federal courts was
recommended by the APA, probably because it
"conforms with the way psychiatrists think and
analyze mental processes."19 Psychiatrists can "be
more comfortable in bringing [their] expertise to bear
in a courtroom setting."20 The jury may have a better
understanding of this definition as well, as "it avoids
the artificiality of trying to separate intellectual from
emotional understanding. "21
In Maryland, however, the test for criminal
responsibility remains the two-prong ALI test. 22
Maryland, therefore, allows expert testimony on the
defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the law
despite the unreliability of such testimony.

14

Reform Act, supra note 1.

B

See id. at 1547.

15

See id.

9

See id. at 1548.

16

10 Seeid.
It

See id.

12 David Cohen. Punishing the Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiatric Testimony
by Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), 40 U. FLA l. REV. 541, 542 (1988) [hereinafter

Cohen).

S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 [hereinafter S.Rep.).
t7

Id.

IBid.
19

FAUST E. ROSSI, EXPERT WiTNESSES 524, 525 (1991) [hereinafter Rossi).

20ld.

13 Phillip J. Resnick, M.D., Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony: A Historical
Perspective of the Hysterical Invective, 14 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & l. 203

211d.

(1986) [hereinafter Resnick).

22

28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 20
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E. The APA Statement
The APA statement carried a great deal of
weight in Congress for changing the Insanity
Defense. Congress echoed most of the APA's
rationale in the legislative notes that accompany the
Act, often quoting the APA statement verbatim.
1. Usurping the Power from the Jury
First, the APA and Congress both agreed that
allowing expert testimony on the issue of criminal
responsibility usurps the power of the jury. Although
this rationale has been repeatedly referred to as
"empty rhetoric,"23 "many commentators agree that
clinicians . . . should stop short of answering the
ultimate legal question."24 The APA statement
pointed out that "determining whether a criminal
defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal factfinders, not for experts. ,,25 The Senate Report echoed
the APA, stating, "Section 406 of Title IV of the Bill
amends Rule 704; [The] purpose of this amendment
is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing
expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory
conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be
found by the trier of fact."26 The House of
Representatives agreed, seeking to disallow expert
testimony on ultimate issues and leave it to the jury to
apply "societal or community values."27
2. Verdict Depends on Credibility of Experts
Second, the essential issue in the trial, namely,
whether the defendant is indeed responsible,
disappears when conflicting expert testimony on
responsibility is permitted. The controversial issue for
the jury to decide then becomes one of the credibility
of the expert witnesses rather than the responsibility
of the defendant. 28 That was clearly the case in the
Hinckley trial, where the prosecution refused to
stipulate that Hinckley was delusional.
Some issues of credibility cannot be avoided
when experts offer conflicting testimony; however, the

23

7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1920-21 (1940).

Stephen K. Hoge and Thomas Grisso, Accuracy and Expert Testimony, 20 BULL
AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1992) [hereinafter Hoge and Grisso].
24

25 APA Statement on Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686 (1983)
[hereinafter APA Statement].
26

federal rule limits conflicting testimony by limiting the
scope of expert opinion.
Since ultimate issue
testimony is not permitted in federal court, the experts
are limited to explaining the defendant's diagnosis,
symptoms, and history. Often, those are areas on
which the prosecution and the defense agree,
disputing only the severity of the symptoms. Thus,
there is a likelihood in federal court that the experts
will, in large part, agree with each other. Jurors can
then deliberate on the responsibility issue, feeling
more confident that both sides' experts were telling
the truth about diagnosis, history, and symptoms.
In Maryland court, where ultimate issue
testimony is permitted, the experts will often voice
their disagreement over the issue of responsibility.
The expert is not required to limit his testimony, so he
can freely testify that the defendant is or is not
responsible, without further explanation. Jurors are
then left hearing conflicting testimony, and the
question in the jury room becomes "Which expert did
you believe?", rather than "Is he responsible?"
Philip Resnick offers six possible explanations
for the psychiatrists' disagreement in the courtroom.
First, such disagreement is bound to result from the
nature of the adversarial system. Second, attorneys
implement witness selection procedures that result in
conflicting testimony. Third, there are many different
schools of psychiatry and, for example, a cognitive
therapist will give a different answer than a
psychodynamic therapist would. Fourth, experts may
use different data. Fifth, experts may be biased.
Sixth, and lastly, he notes the occasional "venality"
of some experts. 29
If the experts are permitted to take the stand
and answer the ultimate question, juries are often
forced to decide the case on credibility of those
experts; the jury is not given the chance to simply
"evaluate the experts' reasoning."30 Jurors are likely
to receive inaccurate testimony in many courts that
allow experts to answer the ultimate question without
a full explanation. "Such testimony obscures the
special expertise of the mental-health professional
and the distinctions between clinical and moral
dimensions. ,,31

S. Rep., supra note 15 [emphasis added].

H. R. REPORT No. 557, 98th Congo 1st Session (1983)., cited in Anne Lawson
Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)
and The Insanity Defense, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 620, 626 (1987).

27

Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule
of Evidence 704(b) and The Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 628 (1987)
[hereinafter Braswell].

29 Resnick,

28

supra note 13, at 209.

30

Braswell, supra note 28, at 628.

31

Hoge and Grisso, supra note 24, at 71.

28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 21
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3. Confuses the Jury
Expert testimony also tends to confuse the jury,
especially because psychiatric terminology and legal
terminology are not synonymous. 32 Sanity, for
example, is a legal issue, not a medical one. 33
Clinical diagnoses, such as psychosis, have no legal
equivalent legal definition and have no correlation to
legal insanity or non-responsibility.34 According to the
APA, when a mental health expert is asked a
question about the ultimate legal issue, he "is
required to make a leap in logic; he no longer
addresses himself to medical concepts but instead
must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable,
namely, the probable relationship between medical
concepts and legal or moral concepts. These leaps
confuse the jury."35 That statement from the APA was
incorporated into the legislative history of the Insanity
Defense Reform Ace 6 and heavily relied on by
Congress.
Expert psychiatric testimony is also confusing
because it is unreliable. Jurors often hear expert
opinion, or test results, and do not know how much
weight to give that testimony because it may be
unreliable. In response to the mental health field's
inability to reliably assess a defendant's behavior at
the exact moment of the crime, many instruments are
now being used to assist the practitioner with his
prediction. Tests like the Mental State at the Time of
the Offense Screening Evaluation (MSO), the
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), and the Rogers
Criminal Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-CRAS)
"were designed to translate the legal insanity
concepts into quantifiable variables that would meet
the standard of reasonable scientific certainty."37 The
R-CRAS measures the patient's "reliability, organicity,
psychopathology, cognitive control, and behavioral
control. "38
As Stephen Morse, an expert in forensic
psychology, points out, any test given to the
defendant is administered after the crime - sometimes

well after the crime - so the results "tell the factfinder
nothing definite about defendant's behavior at the
time of the crime. "39 Morse therefore questions how
much the evidence really assists the jury and how
reliable it really is in the decision-making process. At
least with these scientific evaluations, however, the
jury can hear testimony about reliability of the test
used, rather than just hearing personal opinions from
the expert's experience.
4. The Verdict Involves Moral and Social
Judgments
Also, as the APA explained, the issue of criminal
responsibility has moral and social judgments as well
as the legal and psychological decisions. 40
Psychiatrists have no expertise in this field or with
moral judgments. The APA statistics show a high
degree of reliability (about 80%) "so long as
psychiatric testimony is restricted to medical and
scientific, and not legal or moral issues."41 When the
jury considers criminal responsibility, however, the
issue is entirely legal and moral, therefore reducing
the reliability of the expert testimony.42
Instead of making a moral decision for th.e jury,
the doctor's job in court is to "present medical
information and opinion about the defendant's mental
state and motivation and explain in detail reasons for
his medical conclusion."43 If the expert is permitted to
make judgments about the defendant's sanity, there
is fear the jury "may be led, incorrectly, to infer that
the ultimate questions to be resolved are scientific
rather than moral and experts are permitted to
express opinions on questions which are beyond
clinical expertise."44
Morse
points
out
that
"speculations,
assumptions, and assertions are not substitutes for
hard evidence; unreliable and invalid scientific
evidence cannot assist the factfinder and it may be

Stephen Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and
68 VA. L. REV. 971,1051 (1982) [hereinafter Morse].
40 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 683.

39

Unconsciousness,

APA statement, supra note 25, at 681.
See id.
34 Hoge and Grisso, supra note 24, at 73.
35 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 686.
36 Reform Act, supra note 1.
37 Michaell. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. l. REV. 599, 656 (1989-90) [hereinafter
Perlin].
38 Id., at 656 n.251.

32
33

28.1 U. Baft. L. F. 22

411d.

Well-known expert Michael Perlin explains the insanity defense as a "natural for
philosophical debates," because it involves "notions of free will, determinism,
responsibility, rationality, community standards. and ethical perspectives." Perlin.
supra note 37, at 666.
43 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 686.
44 Richard J. Bonnie and Christopher Siobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA.
l. REV. 427, 456 (1980) [hereinafter Bonnie and Siobogin].

42
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misleading and prejudicial."45 Maryland ignores the
unreliability and moral implications, and permits the
"expert" to render an opinion totally outside his
expertise.
Congress agreed with all of the foregoing
reasons offered by the APA: usurping the jury power,
experts battling for credibility, the potential of
confusing the jury, and the moral aspect tied up with
the verdict. In a time when the public was amazed at
Hinckley's acquittal, Congress chose to limit the
defense exactly as the psychiatrists - the experts
themselves - recommended.
II. Maryland Rule 5-704(b)
Although Congress enacted the Insanity Reform
Act, Maryland has not adopted the federal
modification verbatim. Instead, Maryland codifies the
first part of the federal rule, rejecting opinions about
certain mental states like intent or predisposition, but
then adds an exception permitting opinion about the
ultimate issue of responsibility.46 47 In other words, a
mental health expert would not be permitted, under
Maryland Rule 5-704(b), to give his opinion whether
the defendant was able to form the requisite intent for
murder in the first degree, or whether he was
if
the
predisposed to entrapment. 48 However,
defendant offers a not-criminally responsible plea,
then, and only then, mayan expert give an opinion on
the ultimate issue.
As the Rule Committee
Comments to Maryland Rule 5-704(b) explain, the
expert witness "can be asked if defendant was
suffering from mental disorder, the result of which
caused him to lack substantial capacity to conform to
law."49
Why did Maryland carve out the narrow
exception allowing opinion testimony only on the
issue of criminal responsibility? Most Maryland courts
maintain that there is little difference in opinion
pointing to the ultimate question and opinion that
actually answers the ultimate question. "The

45

Morse. supra note 39, at 1048.

46

MD. R. EVlo.

5-704, §2.704.4 (b)(ii), 199.

It is important to know what exactly is an ultimate issue. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals explains the ultimate issue as the element of the crime that either
acquits or convicts the defendant. "The credibility of a witness is not an ultimate
issue ... [defendantj could not be imprisoned on the basis of such allegation and
proof." Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 215, 636 A.3d. 50, 54 (1993). In
contrast. "the corpus delecti of the crime" or the "criminal agency of the defendant"
are both ultimate issues. See id.
47

distinction between an opinion as to a predicate fact
that inevitably yields the ultimate fact and an opinion
as to the ultimate fact itself [is] a distinction without a
difference. "50 It seems Maryland courts simply were
accustomed to allowing answers on all ultimate
issues, as was permitted before the Hinckley trial and
the Insanity Defense Reform Act. It is important to
note, however, that Maryland did adopt Federal Part
8, and then added the provision that "[t]his exception
does not apply to an ultimate issue of criminal
responsibility. "51
A. Expert Opinion on Intent
The question that remains is, why did Maryland
keep the rest of Federal 704(b), forbidding opinion on
mens rea, or intent issues. The Maryland Court of
Appeals suggests it may be because "a psychiatrist
cannot precisely reconstruct the emotions of a person
at a specific time."52 Whether the defendant had the
intent or predisposition, for example, is mere
conjecture, and beyond the expertise of mental health
experts.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also
explained that "intention is a fact which the accused
can testify to but it cannot be [any] other person
testify[ing] directly concerning the intention of
another. "53 One trial court had allowed the expert to
answer that, due to the defendant's substance abuse
and intoxication, the defendant had "no reason or
understanding at the time of the crime."54 The trial
court, however, would not allow testimony that,
because he was under the influence, a defendant
could not form the necessary mens rea for the
specific intent crime of first degree murder.55 The
Maryland Court of Appeals found no error, holding
that the trial judge was correct in refusing testimony
about intent or mens rea. 56
B. Expert Opinion on Volition
The APA points out that psychiatric opInion
about a defendant's ability to control his behavior,
previously part of the federal test for insanity, is often

50

Cirincione v. Maryland, 75 Md. App. 166. 182. 540 A.2d 1151. 1159 (1988).

51

MD. R. EVlo. 5-704(b), supra note 4. at 196.

Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33.48.542 A.2d 1258, 1265 (1986) (discouraging
expert testimony on the issue of honest belief of self defense).

52

53 Cirincione v. State, 75 Md. App. 166. 180. 540 A.2d 1151. 1158 (1988). See
also Hartless v. State. 327 Md. 558.611 A.2d 581 (1992).

54

Cirincione. 75 Md. App.at 181. 540 A.2d at 1185.

48

Examples taken from S. REP .• supra note 16.

55

See id. at 180. 540 A.2d at 1158.

49

Md. R. Evid. 5-704. supra note 46.

56

See id. at 182, 540 A.2d 1159.
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unreliable and entirely without scientific basis. 57
However, when restricted to the effect of mental
illness, such as whether one could reason or
understand, the opinion is within the realm of the
psychiatrist's expertise.
It is difficult for the
psychiatric expert to make a hindsight assessment as
to whether or not the defendant a) may have had an
intent to commit the crime or b) whether the
defendant could control himself at the time he
committed the crime.
Mental health experts have a great deal of
trouble predicting whether a defendant is insane as
prescribed by the Maryland ALI test. It may be within
their expertise to opine on the definition, symptoms,
or effect of the illness, but psychiatrists cross the line
when they claim to know the defendant's thought
processes influencing control at the time of the
offense. As the APA statement pointed out, "the line
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not
resisted is probably no sharper than that between
twilight and dusk."sa The APA rejects the volition test
because "psychiatric testimony about volition is more
likely to produce confusion for jurors" than expert
testimony about defendant's understanding right from
wrong. 59
Maryland, in keeping the volitional prong, adds
to jury confusion by making the the insanity defense
difficult to understand and promotes unreliable
testimony. Experts in Maryland are testifying to
whether the defendant can control his behavior even
though these experts themselves, in the APA
statement, expressed their inability to assess a
defendant's volition.
III. Comparison between Maryland Rule and
Federal Rule
In everyday practice, the difference between
federal and Maryland courts centers around the
specific words permitted, the questions admitted, and
the extent of the role of experts in the courtroom. The
federal rule, however, allows the same information to
reach the jury in a manner such that the experts do
not usurp the jury's role, confuse them, or make
moral judgments for them.

A. Questions Permitted
1. Federal Court
In federal court, for example, the expert would
not be permitted to answer the question "Did X's
illness impair X's ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his crime?" or "Could X still
understand the wrongfulness of the crime?" Any
answer given would answer the ultimate issue. On
the other hand, the same expert could explain in
great detail the defendant's mental illness and the
effect that illness has on his ability to understand.
Thus, the expert could respond to the question "Was
X suffering from bipolar disorder?" and then go on to
explain the symptoms of this particular condition. As
long as the discussion is kept to psychiatric or
medical terms and focuses on the effect of the illness
in general, as opposed to the effect on the defendant,
the question will most likely be permissible. Likewise,
an expert could answer to "What are the effects or
symptoms of schizophrenia?" or "Does schizophrenia
affect one's ability to differentiate between fantasy
and reality?" Since the attorney can ask these
background questions and keep them vague, the
expert witness can avoid giving the ultimate answer
as to the defendant's responsibility.
The Federal Rule simply "changes the style of
question and answer that can be used to establish
both the offense and the defense thereto."so As
before, everything underlying the opinion is still
permitted, and all testimony pointing to the ultimate
issue is permitted. s1
As the legislative history of 704(b) reflects. the
witness "must be permitted to testify fully about
defendant's psychiatric diagnosis, mental state, and
motivation at the time of the alleged act. "S2 The line
is drawn so that witnesses cannot tell the jury how to
find; the jury must do the work themselves. Although
it prohibits certain questions, "it is clear that Rule
704(b). as interpreted, has not significantly handicapped the receipt of psychological testimony in
criminal cases. "S3
2. Maryland Court
Maryland courts would provide wide latitude and
permit the expert to say anything, although still

60
57

APA Statement. supra note 25, at 685.

U.S. v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1986).

61/d.

s8/d.

62

S. REP. No. 225, quoted in Braswell, supra note 28, at 625.

59/d.

63

Rossi, supra note 19, at 113.
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maintaining that the expert provide the basis for his
opinion rather than just stating the conclusion.
Maryland would therefore do the same as the federal
courts, but would then go a step further by permitti!lg
the expert to answer a question such as, "In your
opinion, was X criminally responsible for his actions
on March 24, 1997?" This would be allowed even
though the expert is in no better position than the jury
to know how X was thinking at that particular time on
March 24.
Dr. Jonas Rappeport, a well-known forensic
psychiatry expert in Maryland, favors the Maryland
rule. He is vehemently opposed to the federal rule,
and enjoys giving his opinion on the ultimate issue
whenever possible. 64 Dr. Rappeport feels the federal
rule "castrates your testimony because you can't tie
everything together."65 In his .experience, most
federal judges let him go on, ignoring the federal rule.
He advocates testifying against the federal rule
because "every time you say anything in federal
court, the prosecutor gets up and says you're in
sacred ground."66 Dr. Rappeport also states that he
has seen many defense attorneys trying to
circumvent the rule by asking hypotheticals.
As one of the authors of the APA statement, Dr.
Rappeport categorizes it as a political move more
than anything else. He states, however, that the APA
position is still the same today as it was in 1984.
3. Hypothetical Questions
Many savvy lawyers try to circumvent Federal
Rule 704(b) whenever possible, hoping the trial judge
will not realize the lawyer is overstepping his bounds.
There has been some disagreement in federal courts
regarding where to draw the line, especially with
hypothetical questions containing facts that mirror the
case on trial.
The Eighth Circuit has found:
[T]he fact that part of the wording of a
question may track the legal test by
asking if the disease prevents one
suffering from the disease from
understanding the nature and quality
of an act does not violate the rule
[because] the jury is left to ultimately

decide whether the disease was so
strongly present that the defendant
himself suffered the effect of being
unable to appreciate the quality of his
act. 67
That position seems to be disfavored, however,
because most other circuits have found that similar
hypothetical questions come too close to the line. In
United States v. Smarf8 , a D.C. Circuit case, the
government's drug expert was asked a hypothetical
question involving facts identical to those in the
case. 6970 In answer to the hypothetical, the witness
said "[H]e met the elements."71 The court of appeals
noted that it was a "close question" because most
cases in federal circuits find a violation when the word
"intent" is used, however in t:lis case the word
"element" was used.72 The court ultimately held that
for the trial court to have allowed the hypothetical was
error. 73
The Smart case was distinguished from United
States v. Boyd, also from the D.C. Circuit, in which
the government also posed a hypothetical, except
that the expert witness used the word "intent" in his
answer.74 In Boyd, the court of appeals held that the
expert testimony violated Federal Rule 704(b)
because the witness was giving an opinion about the
necessary mental state for the crime charged. 75

67

U.S. v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463,1466 (8th Cir. 1990).

68

U.S. v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379 (D.C. Cir 1996).

The prosecutor asked the witness: "A person is observed walking directly to a
spot located next to a building ... picks up a large white, rock-like substance
wrapped in plastic. Within minutes that person is stopped and has a large. white,
rock-like substance on him. It's 25.5 grams that turns out to be cocaine base. He
also has a pager, $580 in bills, 56 empty Ziploc bags, and a 9 millimeter handgun.
With what activity are these actions consistent?"
The defense objected, on the grounds it was not a hypothetical question. The
objection was overruled and the expert answered that according to the
hypothetical, the person was involved in a drug operation. Smart, 98 F.3d at 1385.
69

70 As the Smart case illustrates, many circuit courts have extended the federal rule
so it also excludes ultimate issue testimony by law enforcement officers who are
offered as experts in drug cases, perhaps limiting expert testimony even more than
Congress intended.
It is interesting to note that legislative history, contained in the Senate Report,
suggests Congress only intended to limit expert testimony by mental health
experts, but no federal circuit court has drawn such a limit. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §704.2 (4th ed. 1996).
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Smart, 98 F.3d at 1386.

The court held the error was harmless, however, due to the totality of property
admiHed evidence against Smart and the absence of eXCUlpatory evidence. Id. at
1390.
73

64 Telephone interview with Jonas Rappeport, M.D., expert in forensic psychiatry
and member of the APA (March 21, 1997).
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U.S. v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667,670 (D.C. Cir, 1995). The witness answered that the
facts of the hypothetical showed "possession with intent to distribute." Id.

66ld.

75

74
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Apparently, use of the word "intent" automatically
violates 704(b), stepping over the line of ultimate
issue territory.76 In order to resolve their close
question, the Smart court looked to the rationale
underlying the rule, especially the rationale of
preventing juries from attaching "undue weight" to
expert testimony.77 Ultimately, the court held that the
testimony came too close to the 704(b) line because
of the "context of the interchange and the use of other
words connoting intent. "7B
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit
rule, which instructs the court to consider two key
elements of the testimony: (1) the language used by
either the attorney or the expert; and (2) whether the
context clearly shows the expert opinion is "based on
knowledge of general criminal practices" and not a
special or personal knowledge of the defendant's
practices. 79
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with
hypothetical questions in the Manley case, holding
that "courts cannot permit the use of the hypothetical
question as a vehicle to circumvent the clear mandate
of Rule 704(b)."BO In that case, the key word "intent"
was not even used. Rather, the defense asked its
expert whether, hypothetically, a person suffering
from bipolar disorder would "be able to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of their
actions."B1 Thus, the defense attorney phrased his
hypothetical in the exact terms of the insanity rule
itself. The objection was sustained and the expert
was not permitted to answer.
The Manley court contrasted another Eleventh
Circuit case, United States v. Davis.B2 In the Davis
case the question was whether a person with multiple
personality disorder was able to understand what he
was doing. The court allowed the expert to answer
because the question "sought an explanation of the
disease and its typical effect on a person's mental
state. "B3

These cases establish that the key element is
the particular words used; one cannot phrase the
question in the exact terminology as the insanity test
itself, yet background questions that elicit a better
understanding of the mental illness will be admitted.
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Congress intended
to allow expert testimony on the issue of whether the .
defendant's behavior corresponded to a certain
diagnosis.B4 After that, the jury decides whether,
because of the mental disorder, the defendant was
insane at the time of the crime. B5
Perhaps the Second Circuit summarized it best
when Judge McLaughlin explained that the testimony
in question was impermissible because it "stat[ed] the
bottom-line inference, leaving it to the jury merely to
murmur, 'Amen."'B6 The Federal Rule prohibits the
expert from stating the inference, so that the expert
"must leave the inference, however obvious, for the
jury to draw."B7
In the Maryland courts, of course, one need not
pose a hypothetical because the witness is permitted
to answer specific questions regarding the
defendant's responsibility. There is no need for line
drawing because the court has unlimited discretion to
allow expert opinions on the question of
responsibility.
B. Criticism of Maryland Rule 704(b)
Therefore, while the jury's bottom-line question
remains the same no matter which court hears the
case, the way the jury answers that question will vary,
depending where they are. Thus, when in federal
court, the jury will have to absorb all of the testimony
illustrating the effect of mental illness and apply that
information to the facts at hand. Conversely, in
Maryland court, the jury has already heard the mental
health expert state that "X was unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct," so the only
remaining question is whether the expert is believable
and convincing. Also, if there are two conflicting
experts in Maryland court, i.e., one for each side, the
jury is likely to be confused and the issue comes
down to which expert is more credible and
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See id.
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Id. at 13B9.

791d. paraphrasing United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1994).
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U.S. v. Manley, 893 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1990).

84 The attorney could ask, for example, "Is this behavior indicative of anti-social
personality?" Id.
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Id. at 1222.
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U.S. v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1988) (cited in Manley, 893 F.2d at 1224).
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Davis at 835 F.2d at 274, (cited in Manley, 893 F.2d at 1224).
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convincing.
That is particularly the question
Congress wanted to eliminate by enacting Part B.
1. Expert Testimony is to Assist the Jury
Expert testimony, no matter what the subject, is
offered to "assist the trier of fact. "88 Maryland's rule,
however, goes beyond that. It not only helps the jury,
but does the jury's job for them. A question arises as
to which of the following answers would assist the
jury: (1) "X could not appreciate the wrongfulness of
the crime and therefore is not responsible;" (2) "X's
delusions at the time could have misled him so that
he thought he was stabbing a bear in self defense,
and not a person." While the former may help the
jury go home earlier because they are given the
answer to the ultimate issue, the latter example
actually helps them in deliberations and helps them
reach the ultimate issue on their own.
Further, the first answer involves issues of
morality and responsibility, whereas the second
illustrates the effect of the illness, without
incorporating legal concepts. Although the first
answer mayor may not be reliable' or valid,
"testimony regarding the nature and relative severity
of defendant's psychological dysfunction and
informed estimates of what he may have known,
perceived, or intended at a particular time, lie within
the expertise of mental health professionals."89 It is
more helpful for the jury to receive testimony in the
form of the second answer because the jurors receive
reliable, psychiatric testimony that is not couched in
legal jargon.
As Morse explained, "experts offering legal
conclusions are operating as extra, unnecessary
jurors."90 If the expert is on the stand to assist· the
jury with the evidence that is beyond their knowledge,
the expert should limit his testimony to that type of
material only. Once he states whether or not the
defendant was responsible, he becomes the
thirteenth juror.
2. The issue of criminal responsibility is no
more difficult than other jury issues.
The question remains: Why bother making a
special exception just for criminal responsibility?
Criminal responsibility is no more difficult than any
other issue for the jury. Expert testimony is utilized

because the expert is presumed to be more
competent to answer the questions than the jury.
However, the concept of criminal responsibility is not
beyond the understanding of the jury, so long as they
are given the legal test. The jurors are equally as
competent as the expert witness to take all of the
evidence, incorporate that evidence into the facts,
and create a complete picture ultimately leading to
their verdict.
Federal Rule 704(b) encourages the expert to
explain any and all information to assist the jury in
reaching a decision. Likewise, Rule 705 permits the
court to require the expert to give his underlying facts
or data. With all of those facts offered for the jury to
digest, asking for expert opinion on the defendant's
criminal responsibility seems like overkill. Maryland
should give its juries more credit, assuming they are
able to take all the information provided and
competently apply the information to the criminal
responsibility test.
3. Maryland fosters confusion
The rationale underlying Federal Rule 704(b)
pertains to Maryland Rule 5-704(b) as well. One of
the most compelling reasons provided by Congress
was to "eliminate the confusing spectacle of
competing expert witnesses testifying to contradictory
conclusions. ,,91
Maryland instead fosters such
confusion by encouraging experts to take the stand
and opine as to the defendant's ability to appreciate
the wrongfulne~s of his alleged crime at the time it
was committed.
4. The "expert" has no expertise
The second reason supported by Congress is
perhaps the most significant: mental health "experts"
are not experts in law92 or moral issues. Expert
testimony is presented simply because the expert
possesses some "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."93 However, as the APA and
Congress agree, the mental health expert does not
have any special knowledge when it comes to legal
terms. He or she is an expert in mental health
issues, concepts, and theory. Thus, any testimony
given should be restricted to only those issues,
concepts, and theories. Responsibility for crime is
not a scientific concept.
S. REP., supra note 16. at 231.
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Bonnie and Siobogin, supra note 44, at 456 (emphasis added).
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39, at 1057.
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FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Dr. Jay Katz is an expert in this field and has
examined the issue from both perspectives.
According to Katz, a psychiatrist and professor of law,
permitting expert testimony on the ultimate issue
contributes significantly to the so called "battle of the
experts. "94 Katz insists he will not answer ultimate
questions in court because those are questions a
psychiatrist cannot answer.95 "I can tell a story that I
hope will aid judge and jury in making the moral/legal
judgment that only they can make. "96 He is in favor of
the federal rule prohibiting testimony on the
responsibility question because it would force the
psychiatric expert "to [attend] to the person and, after
all, it is the person they have been trained to evaluate
and not the law's jurisprudence. "97 Moreover, Katz
believes the experts should express "the uncertainties
that affect their judgments and conclusions" and
believes we should be critical of the questions
lawyers are permitted to ask. 98
5. Jury participation leads to a fairer trial
It also seems the defendant gets a fairer trial if
the jury makes the decision instead of just adopting
the expert's opinion based solely on the assumption
that the expert is more knowledgable. Although
Professor Wigmore characterized the idea of usurping
the jury's function as "empty rhetoric,"99 there is
something to be said for asking the jury to sift through
the evidence themselves, deliberate, and reach an
independent decision. The jury system is in place to
ensure fairness; twelve impartial people are supposed
to be the fact finders. If the jury is going to accept the
expert's opinion without careful consideration, the trial
may as well be a bench trial. It
is
not
the
psychiatrist's job to set the standard and decide who
is responsible and who is not. That is strictly the jury's
responsibility. Do we, as a society concerned with
justice, really want someone's fate to be based not on
the facts in the case, but on which side can hire a
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Jay Katz, M.D., "The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert" Revisited, 20 BULL. AMER.
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Id. at 149-50.

99 WIGMORE,
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more credible expert? Maryland Rule 5-704(b)
stands in the way of fairness because the question of
the ultimate issue, and therefore the defendant's fate,
is in the hands of the experts. The verdict comes
down to "may the most credible expert win", not "may
justice be done."
IV. Proposal
Maryland's exception allowing opinion testimony
on the issue of responsibility is misplaced. The issue
of responsibility is the most difficult and unreliable
area of mental health expertise.
There is no
reason to treat testimony on criminal responsibility
any differently from testimony on
intent,
predisposition, malice, or other mental states. Mental
health professionals have no higher ability to predict
responsibility for the crime than they have to predict
intent. If Maryland is going to continue to codify
Federal Rule 704(b), the Maryland Rule should drop
the last sentence and adopt the federal rule verbatim.
V. Conclusion
Congress enacted Federal Rule 704(b) in
response to the overwhelming outrage of the insa'nity
defense and Hinckley's trial. Although the impetus
behind the Insanity Defense Reform Act was the APA
statement and public outcry, the Act itself changed
the insanity qefense for the better.
Tho fears addressed by the APA statement -usurping the power of the jury; confusing the jury;
experts making moral judgments; and a verdict
dependant on credibility of witnesses -- still survive
today. These fears are legitimate and stand in the
way of a defendant getting a fair trial.
Maryland Rule 5-704(b) attempts to alleviate
those fears when it comes to intent or mental state,
but does nothing for the defendant who pleads not
criminally responsible. For that defendant, his trial is
still a "battle of the experts," with the experts
determining the outcome rather than the facts
determining his fate.
Maryland should give the APA statement a
thorough reading and do some further research.
Federal Rule 704(b) exists as it does for good reason
- to preserve the integrity of the trial and try to
promote fairness and jury involvement.

